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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
DOCTRINE AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
CLYDE CROCKETT*
1. INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine was formulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hemandez1 as follows: "The courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory."2 As a matter of law, this doctrine has
been construed to prohibit American courts from determining the legality
of certain acts by foreign states.3 Furthermore, in some circumstances
the doctrine requires that courts uphold the foreign act, either by
affording affirmative relief or an affirmative defense.4
* Professor, Indiana University School of Law, B.A. 1962; J.D. 1965, University of
Texas; L.L.M. 1972, London School of Economics.
1. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
2. Id at 252.
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1 443 (1987).
4. This statement is illustrated in the expropriation cases:
(1) Cuba issues a decree of expropriation of tangible property located
within its territory. The property is sold and Cuba seeks the
proceeds on the theory that through the expropriation, Cuba is the
owner of the property. The act of state doctrine requires that
Cuba's claim succeed (give effect to the act as intended, by Cuba).
Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-37
(1964).
(2) Mexico confiscates goods of P, intending to become owner of the
property. Mexico transfers the property to D. P sues D for the
property. The application of the act of state Doctrine would, in this
circumstance, afford D an affirmative defense to P's claim that the
D transfer to Mexico was invalid and illegal. Judgment is for D on
the merits. Cf Ricaud v. American Metal Co. Ltd., 246 U.S. 304
(1918); see also Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (false
imprisonment claim by American citizen against Venezuelan military
commander for his act of prohibiting plaintiff from leaving country
was dismissed on the merits); LAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (various causes of
action against OPEC for illegal price-fixing were dismissed on the
merits).
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This so-called "confused"5 doctrine is purportedly misunderstood by
the American judiciary and by commentators,6 who, as I am eager to do,
reconsider,7 reformulate, 8 restructure,9 rethink, 10 and rehabilitate the
doctrine." The act of state doctrine has been classified as a conflict of
laws rule,12 specifically a choice-of-law rule or a rule that is intimately
related to choice-of-law. 13 This Article focuses on these characterizations
of, and purported relationships between, the act of state doctrine and
conflict of laws rules. I will analyze three theories which link the act of
state doctrine to choice-of-law. One view is that the act of state doctrine
is a choice-of-law rule, insofar as an act of state is a "law" and the
doctrine requires that "law" be applied to determine the merits of a
particular issue. 4 Under the second theory, the doctrine is viewed as a
choice-of-law rule explained as follows: The act of state doctrine requires
that a foreign state's law be applied to determine the effect of the
foreign state's act; the applicable law of the foreign state is presumed to
render the act valid and effective) 5 Under the third theory, the act of
5. Few legal theories are in such a state of utter confusion as the act of state
[d]octrine] - confusion so complete that the doctrine does not necessarily have
anything to do with an act, it does not serve only state interests, and no one
but a Supreme Court Justice would have the temerity to label it a doctrine.
J. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 268 (1988).
Professor Dellapenna's book contains an excellent chapter on the act of state Doctrine.
He addresses most of the issues discussed in this article. See id, at 268-84.
6. See Kirgis, Act of State Exceptions and Choice of Law, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 173
(1972).
7. See Leigh & Sandier, Dunhill: Toward a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. 3. INT'L
L. 685 (1976).
8. See Hahn, Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba: A Reformulation of the Act of State Doctrine,
11 U. WEsr L.A. L. REv. 15 (1979).
9. See Mathias, Restructuring the Act of State Doctrine: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform,
12 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 369 (1980).
10. See Chow, Rethinkdng the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction
to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REV. 397 (1987).
11. See Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U' J.
INT'L L. & POL 599 (1980).
12. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 443 comment c (1987).
13. See, e.g., Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("A federal
rule mandating a choice-of-law by which to judge the validity of the official act of sovereign
states."); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 n.30
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) ( The "[a]ct of [sjtate [d]octrine invokes choice-of-law concepts .. "); see
also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 726 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1114 (5th Cir. 1985).
14. See Kirgis, Understanding the Act of State Doctrine's Effect, 82 AM. J. IN 'L L. 58, 60
(1988).
15. See Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM.
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state doctrine is not triggered unless the choice-of-law rule of the forum
directs that the foreign state's law govern. At that point, the act of state
doctrine precludes the forum state from invoking public policy to deny
effect to the foreign state's act.
16
The results of the application of the act of state doctrine may be
explained by any one, or a combination of, these theories. I advocate,
however, an alternative theory that does not depend upon a choice-of-
law analysis. This alternative theory presents the act of state doctrine as
a special conflict of laws rule that is not a choice-of-law rule. The
purported relationships between the doctrine and choice-of-law, although
not completely untenable, are unnecessary and misleading, and this
confused and controversial area of the law needs to be clarified. I
conclude with an examination and rejection of the assertion that if the
act of state doctrine is for some reason unavailable to a courts, a foreign
state's act should be subject to "normal" choice-of-law methodology.17
II. CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
In the choice-of-law process, a court calls upon "rules to determine
which law (its own local law or the local law of another state) shall be
applied ... to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties resulting
from an occurrence involving foreign elements."' 8 For example, under
the traditional approach, substantive issues in tort law are generally
governed by the law of the state where the tort occurred; this is a typical
choice-of-law rule. It directs a court in State F, where the rule is
operative, to apply the domestic law of State X if a tort has occurred in
State X. It follows, therefore, that even if the choice-of-law rule and the
facts underlying the issue be known, the issue is not resolved until the
domestic law of State X is isolated. 19
Choice-of-law rules "do not themselves determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties, but rather guide decision as to which local law
rules will be applied to determine these rights and duties."' This is
always a characteristic of choice-of-law rules, regardless of whether they
are based on traditional theories or on modern theories such as interest
L. REv. 1247, 1255 (1977).
16. See Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PENN. L. REv. 325, 387-88
(1986); Chow, supra note 10, at 431; Goldie, The Sabbatino Case: International Law Versus
The Act of State, 12 UCLA L. REv. 107, 110 (1964).
17. See Kirgis, supra note 14, at 58.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLJcr OF LAWS § 2 comment a(3) (1971).
19. See id; see also id § 4.
20. Id. § 2 comment a(3).
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analysis21 or a most-significant-relationship approach.3 Although these
latter theories are ostensibly less rigid and dogmatic than the traditional
vested rights theory,23 they nevertheless contemplate choice-of-law rules
that require a court to resort to internal rules before reaching a result.
Under either an interest analysis or a most-significant-relationship
approach, internal rules of law must be isolated and applied to determine
whether the conditions for applying choice-of-law rules are fulfilled.24 In
contrast, under a traditional approach, choice-of-law rules are applied
irrespective of the result reached after the internal law of a jurisdiction
is applied.2
A. The Act of State Doctrine as a Choice-of-Law Rule
The characterization of the act of state doctrine as a choice-of-law
rule may be traced to Professor Louis Henkin: "The act of state doctrine
... says that the foreign 'law' (i.e., the act of state) must govern certain
transactions and that no public policy of the forum may stand in the
way."26 In 1983, I described the act of state doctrine as a "special
choice-of-law rule, '27 which "directs that the law to be applied to resolve
a particular issue is the act itself, regardless of its form."28 Professor
Frederick Kirgis espouses a similar view:
A few years after the Sabbatino case was decided, Louis Henkin
demonstrated that the act of state doctrine is a federal choice-
of-law rule. He showed that the effect of declining to apply it
in any given case is simply to remove it as the controlling
choice-of-law rule. In the absence of a statutory directive, the
court would then use its normal choice-of-law approach to select
21. Under interest analysis; "[Tlhe central problem of conflicts of laws may be defined
... as that of determining the appropriate rule of decision when the interests of two or
more states are in conflict . . .in other words, of determining which interest shall yield."
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE LJ. 171, 173.
22. The most-significant-relationship approach consists of determining the applicable
law through an evaluation of various factors which are epitomized in RESrATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONFUCr OF LAws § 6 (1971); see also id § 145 (discussing torts issues) and
id§ 188 (discussing contracts issues).
23. See, eg, RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCr OF LAws §§ 145, 188 (1971).
24. Id § 6 comments c, f.
25. Id
26. Henkin, Act of State Today: Reflections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L.
175, 178 (1967).
27. Crockett, Choice-of-Law Aspects of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 18
LAw & POL'Y IN INVtL Bus. 1041, 1054 (1983).
28. Id
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the governing law. It might look to international law principles,
but only insofar as they are incorporated into federal statutory
or common law in the United States, and only if the choice-of-
law process selects U.S. law. On the other hand, if the act of
state doctrine is applied, its effect is either to choose the foreign
law and preempt any escape device, or-essentially the same
thing-to preclude the application of United States regulatory
law (such as U.S. antitrust law) to conduct that stems from a
foreign governmental act. 9
The following discussion rests upon an important assumption-the
choice-of-law theory of the act of state doctrine does not depend upon
any presumption about the validity or effect of the act of state. 0 Rather,
the act of state is applied to and resolves an issue.31 Furthermore, if the
doctrine is a choice of law rule, the theory must be that the act of state
is itself a "law" for the purpose of a choice-of-law analysis.
1. "Applying" the Act of State
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,3 2 Cuba authorized its
president and prime minister to expropriate American owned property in
1960.33 The Cuban president issued the following executive decree
ordering the expropriation: "The Cuban State is hereby subrogated in the
place and stead of the juridical persons listed in the preceding section,
in respect of the property, rights and interests aforesaid, and of the assets
and liabilities constituting the capital of said enterprises." 34 Ultimately,
the case turned upon the issue of whether Cuba was entitled to the
proceeds of the sale of the property on the basis of its expropriation.-5
The Court held that the act of state doctrine precluded American courts
from judging the validity of the expropriation under Cuban, international,
or state law. The Sabbatino Court did not mention the effect that the
ruling had on the disposition of property. Although the Court was silent
on this issue, its reversal of the lower court meant that Cuba's act of
29. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 58.
30. See Kirgis, supra note 6, at 179-80; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS
§ 6 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TEE UNITED STATES §§
443(1), 443 comment a (1987).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 443,
443(a) (1985).
32. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
33. Id at 403.
34. Id at 405 n.7.
35. Id at 400-01.
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state had to be given effect in the United States by holding that Cuba
was entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the expropriated property.
To conform to traditional choice-of-law analysis, it must be that the
executive decree was applied, because the law authorizing the expropria-
tion did not resolve the issue before the Court.3 Because the expropria-
tion decree contained recitals that the Cuban state was, in effect, the
owner of the property,37 one could conclude that the act of state supplied
the rule of decision.
In other cases, the results of applying the act of state doctrine
cannot be so easily described as applying the act to resolve the issue.38
In French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,'39 Cuba issued a currency regula-
tion, and on the basis of that regulation, refused to pay an obligation in
United States dollars.40 The injured party sued for damages for breach
of contract, and the court dismissed the action on the basis of the act of
state doctrine. 41 The Court considered the Cuban Government's refusal
to pay to be the relevant act of state.42 If one attempted to resolve the
issue of the rights of the parties solely by reference to Cuba's refusal, no
decision would have been reached because that act did not reveal any
rule to address and resolve the substantive issue in the case, as did the
act in Sabbatino. Arguably, if the currency regulation were viewed as the
relevant act of state, then indeed, that act might be viewed as having
provided, in effect, a defense to the breach of contract action. Neverthe-
less, unlike Sabbatino, nothing in the series of acts in French is explicit
as to its legal effect on a breach of contract action.43
LAM v. OPEC44 addressed the issue of whether defendant govern-
ments were guilty of illegal price-fixing in violation of United States
antitrust laws. 45 The court found the act of state doctrine to be appli-
cable, and therefore, it did not determine the legality of the price-
fixing.46 In effect, the act of state doctrine provided a defense to the
antitrust action, but that defense was hardly derived from the act of
36. Id. at 436-37.
37. Id at 405 n.7.
38. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Empresa Cubana Exportada v.
Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981); 1AM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981);
French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704 (1963).
39. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E. 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
40. Id
41. Id at 52, 242 N.E.2d at 708; 295 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40.
42. Id at 53, 242 N.E.2d at 709; 295 N.Y.S.2d at 440-41.
43. Id at 66, 242 N.E.2d at 723; 295 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60.
44. 649 F.2d 1354 (4th Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 1361.
46. Id
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state.4 7
In the landmark case of Underhill v. Hemandez,18 an American citizen
sued a Venezuelan military official, Hernandez, for false imprisonment.49
The Court applied the act of state doctrine, and as a result, dismissed the
claim.50 The act of state involved was Hernandez's refusal to grant
permission to Underhill to leave Venezuela.51 The substantive issue was
whether Hernandez's refusal was actionable as false imprisonment. 2 If
resolution of that issue were sought from Hernandez's act, one would be
bereft of a rule to determine the issue.
Professor Kirgis offers Empresa Cubana Exportadona v. Lambom &
Co.,53 as an example of a case where an act of a foreign state is applied
on a "counterclaim. 54 In Lamborn, the defendant asserted a counter-
claim to recover damages from the plaintiff for losses suffered by a
Cuban expropriation that allegedly violated international law. 5 The act
of state doctrine prohibited the court from hearing the defendant's
challenge and further prohibited the court from denying the act its
intended effect.5 6  If the court had allowed the counterclaim to be
asserted, either because the expropriation was against public policy or
violated international law, the act of state doctrine would have been
violated. 7 Cuban "law" was not applied to the issue, even assuming that
the expropriation of assets was Cuban "law." By that act, Cuba intended
to be the owner of the expropriated property.58 But the Cuban act, even
if it were treated as law, was not relevant to the issue before the court.
In Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,59 the Court held that the act of
state doctrine applied. The case involved a claim to property belonging
to a Mexican mining company -that had been seized by a Mexican
military commander of a faction later recognized as the government of
47. Jurisdiction in Sherman Act cases depends upon whether United States law is
applicable. Id Because the act of state doctrine precluded the application of United States
law, the court did not have jurisdiction. See id. at 1361-62; see also Note, supra note 15,
at 1247.
48. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id. at 251.
52. Id
53. 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981).
54. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 60.
55. Lambom, 652 F.2d at 236; see Kirgis, supra note 14, at 60.
56. Lambom, 652 F.2d at 236.
57. Id
58. 1d
59. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
1989]
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Mexico.6 The mining company's property was demanded by, and
delivered to, the commander.6 1 The commander gave the company a
receipt for the property which included a promise to pay for the property
upon the revolution's success; the commander then sold the property to
Ricaud.62 The plaintiff, American Metal Company, claimed title to the
property on the basis of its purchase from the mining company.6 The
Court held that the seizure and subsequent sale of the property divested
the title from the plaintiff.4
There are several reasons why the result in Ricaud could not have
been derived solely from the act or acts involved. Typically, in choice-
of-law analysis, the potentially applicable rule of the foreign state is
normally one that that state would apply to the issue in an entirely
domestic (i.e., from the foreign state's point of view) case. s An analogy
may be drawn between a typical private case and a typical act of a state
case involving expropriation. Suppose, for example, that P sues D for
replevin of property, the transfer of which took place in foreign state X.
P takes the position that, under the law of state X, the transfer was
invalid because D coerced it. The following issues must be resolved
under the rules of state X: (1) what constitutes coercion with respect to
transfers of property? and, if coercion is found; (2) what are the rights
and obligations of the parties? The act alone reveals nothing about the
answers to these questions. Similarly, if D is a public official as in
Ricaud, the act of the transfer does not address the issues actually
presented."6 Even if the act is treated as a "law," it does not answer the
questions before the Court. In Ricaud, however, the Court furnishes the
principal judicial support (albeit in dictum) for the theory under
consideration:67
[The act of state doctrine] requires ... that, when it is made to
appear that the foreign government has acted in a given way on
the subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such action or
the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be
accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision."6
60. Id at 309.
61. Id. at 306.
62. Id
63. Id at 300.
64. Id at 310.
65. For the foreign state's perspective, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF
LAws, § 6(b) (1971).
66. Ricau4 246 U.S. at 310.
67. Id at 309.
68. Id
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Thus, the court must, if the proper circumstances exist, give effect to the
act. This does not mean that the act furnishes the rule of decision on
the substantive issue.69 In other words, the rule in Ricaud could be
restated to mean that a party deriving title from a transfer by an
expropriating government has good title.70 To require that the act be
"accepted" does not necessarily mean that it is "applied." The details of
the action could be "accepted" by formulating a rule of law (e.g., the
holding in LamboM71 gives effect to the intention behind Cuba's act). If
the Ricaud Court meant that the details of the action are to be "ap-
plied," a very troubling question arises: why did the Court refrain from
applying the promise to pay for the goods? No rational choice-of-law
explanation exists to help elicit an answer to this question.
2. The Act of State as "Law"
Even if the act of state doctrine might be explained in some cases
as resulting in the application of the act of state, if it is truly a choice-
of-law rule, the act involved must be a law. 72 The Supreme Court has
suggested that acts of state, regardless of their form, are "laws.."7 3
Although the door is open for the Court to recharacterize the operation
of the act of state doctrine, the use of the term "rule for ... decision"
in Ricaud74 certainly suggests that the Court viewed the acts in that case
as laws. Likewise, in Sabbatino, the Court stated that the "doctrine...
concerns the limits for determining the validity of an otherwise applicable
rule of law,"75 after it held that the act of state doctrine precluded the
Court from judging the validity of the "taking." 76 Thus, the "taking" was
ostensibly considered to establish the applicable law. And in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,77 Justice Holmes asserted: "The decree
of the sovereign makes law."78
69. Id
70. Id
71. 652 F.2d 231, 239 (1981).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCr OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
73. Id at 726.
74. Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 309.
75. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964).
76. Id at 428.
77. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
78. Id at 358. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court noted that the act of state doctrine
is not "compelled ... by the inherent nature of sovereign authority, as some of the earlier
decisions seem to imply." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421. One of the "earlier decisions" cited
by the Court was American Banana, 213 U.S. at 347. The Court's rejection of the American
1989]
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Accepting this theory entails consequences courts might wish to avoid
in certain cases. In Sabbatino, the plaintiff contended that under Cuban
law the expropriation was a nullity.79 The Court refused to apply Cuban
law because to do so would increase the potential for error, and if the
decision were wrong, run the risk of insulting Cuba.80 Yet, under the
"act is law" theory, the Court would have applied Cuban law and
determined that under Cuban law title had passed. Likewise, in Ricaud,
the Court would have applied Mexican law to determine that the
government acquired good title. It is doubtful that the Court would
describe these act of state decisions as reflecting choice-of-law rules
because the act could have been invalidated under all the relevant laws
of the acting state. In effect, the Court would be elevating an invalid act
to the status of law and applying it. Such a result would have an
adverse effect upon the Supreme Court as a judicial institution for having
made an erroneous ruling which it obviously strives to avoid. To be sure,
Sabbatino could be viewed as a case in which the law of Cuba (either
the executive decree or the resolution together with the legislative
enactment authorizing the expropriation) was applied8' and where the
expropriation was valid under "other" Cuban law. In other contexts,
however, the validity of the act under the law of the acting state is not
as clear. The act of state doctrine has been applied even in cases where
a government, whose act was in question, contended that the act was
invalid under its municipal law." Though not conclusive, such a position
Banana rationale, however, does not weaken the view that acts of state are laws. The
earlier cases suggested that invalidating and refusing to apply an act of state would deprive
the acting state of territorial sovereignty. In Sabbatino, the Court rejected this rationale:
If a transaction takes place in one jurisdiction and the forum is in another, the
forum does not by dismissing an action or by applying its own law purport to
divest the first jurisdiction of its territorial sovereignty; it merely declines to
adjudicate or make applicable its own law to parties or property before it.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421. The act could still be viewed as law - it is applied, not on the
basis of the notion of territorial sovereignty, but rather on some other basis.
79. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 413.
80. Id at 415 n.17.
81. Cuban law may be seen as either the executive resolution, id. at 403-05 n.7 (quoting
Cuban Executive Power Resolution No. 1), or the resolution together with the legislative
enactment that authorized the expropriation. Id. at 401-02 nn.3-4 (quoting Law No. 851
of July 6, 1960, adopted by Cuban Council of Ministers).
82. See, e.g., Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940);
see Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 415 n.7 where the Court noted, as follows:
In dictum in Hudson v. Guesher, 4 Cranch 293, 294, 2 L.Ed. 625, Chief Justice
Marshall declared that one nation must recognize the act of the sovereign power
of another, so long as it has jurisdiction under international law, even if its
improper according to the internal law of the latter state. This principle has been
followed in a number of cases.
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is strong evidence that the act is invalid under that law. To conclude
that the court has treated the act as law and applied it would not only
raise questions of the proper role of the judiciary, but also insult and
anger the foreign state. This would run afoul of one of the major
underpinnings of the act of state doctrine.8
Furthermore, the term "law" has a definite meaning in conflict of
laws analysis.84 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws defines
law as the "body of standards, principles and rules ... which the courts
.. apply in the decision of controversies brought before them."s  In
cases where a government or governmental agency injures a private
citizen, the courts of that government do not apply the act which caused
the injury to determine liability. While it is curious to consider all acts
of state as laws, some acts of state are legislative in origin or in
character.86 In Sabbatino, the act of state (expropriation) was in the
form of a written executive decree, with normative language.87 The
decree was similar to an administrative regulation that defines duties and
is treated as a rule of law in litigation, although it does not emanate
directly from the legislature.8u Thus, it is possible to characterize the
result of Sabbatino as applying a law to the issue. It may be that the
acting state would treat such acts as laws; however, it would be im-
plausible to consider all acts of state as laws in choice-of-law analysis.
An act of state for purposes of the act of state doctrine may take both
formal and informal forms. Such action may be viewed as "lawful" or as
having the force or effect of law. This characterization is an accurate
assessment of the effect of the act of state doctrine, without the necessity
of equating the act as law.89 In other words, the equation may simply be
metaphoricaPl and while some cases might support this theory, several
cases clearly contradict it.91
83. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431-32 ("Dispositions ... involving the probability of the
affront to another state could seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on by the
executive branch ....").
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP CONFUCrs OF LAWS § 4(1) (1971).
85. Id.
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
443 comment i (1987).
87. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 403-05 nn.3-4 (quoting Cuban Executive Power Resolution
No. 1).
88. Id. at 401-02 nn. 3-4 (quoting Law No. 851 of July 6, 1960, adopted by Cuban
Council of Ministers).
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443
comment i (1987).
90. Henkin, supra note 26, at 178.
91. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-22.
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B. The Municipal Law Theory of the Act of State Doctrine
An alternative view of the act of state doctrine conforms more
closely to the modern understanding of the term "law" in conflict-of-
laws analysis and to the traditional conception of choice-of-law rules.9
Under this theory, the act of state doctrine requires that the acting
state's municipal law govern the issue of validity of the state action. The
act is presumed (irrebuttable) to be valid under that state's municipal
law, with the usual caveat that public policy may not be invoked to deny
effect to the actY'
Earn Line S.S. Co v. Sutherland S.S. Co.9 and The Adriatic are cases
which demonstrate that an action of a foreign nation committed within
its own territory is presumptively valid. These cases include situations
where a claim for relief is based upon the assertion that the foreign
government has violated its own law and that the act is invalid under
that law.9 Even if these cases hold that application of the lay' of the
foreign state creates an irrebuttable presumption of validity, they do not
hold that the act of state doctrine itself led to the application of a
foreign law.97 In the typical case, one party contends thal because the
act is invalid under the acting state's law the act should not be given
effect and no right to relief exists. The application of the act of state
doctrine in such circumstances simply could be viewed as precluding
these contentions from being entertained, without any necessity of
applying the foreign law and indulging in any presumption of validity.
98
In Earn Line,99 the defendants sought to excuse their breach of a
charter party due to an action of the British admiralty, 100 and the
plaintiffs took the position that the admiralty's action was illegal under
British law.' 0' The court stated that "[t]he act of another sovereign
92. Note, supra note 15, at 1253.
93. 1,d at 1255 n.37. The commentator further states, "In other words, the doctrine
requires the courts to reject civil causes of action based on the assertion that a damaging
act of a foreign state violates either United States. or international law." d at 1255. This
is an accurate description of the doctrine which does not employ a choice-of-law
classification.
94. 254 F. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
95. 258 F. 902 (3d Cir. 1919).
96. Earn Line, 254 F. at 129; Adriatic, 258 F. at 904-05.
97. Earn Line, 254 F. at 131; Adriatic, 258 F. at 904.
98. Earn Line, 254 F. at 129, Adriatic, 258 F. at 904.
99. Earn Line, 254 F. at 126.
100. Id. at 127.
101. Id. at 129.
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within its own territory is of necessity legal;"'0 however, it did not state
that the act was necessarily legal "under its own law."103 Indeed, the
Court explained: "It is quite true that the act of any public official of
a foreign state may in fact be illegal by the municipal law of that state,
but no domestic court may admit such a possibility. Hence, I should not
entertain this issue."'1° The Adriatic'0' involved a suit for breach of a
charter party, the vessel having been requisitioned by the British. The
charterer contended that the taking was invalid under English law.1 6 The
court held: "[The act] must be accepted as legal, or, as it is sometimes
expressed, such a question is not justiciable. ' 7 The court clearly stated
that it was not deciding the validity vel non of the act under English law,
presumptively or otherwise: "The libels are dismissed without prejudice
to the right of the libelants to institute another action in any court which
is in a position to pass upon the question which ... we have not felt at
liberty to inquire into."' Similarly, other courts explicitly recognize that
the issue of validity under an independent legal standard is not the issue
to be decided, but rather recognize that a sovereign may violate its own
law and may have done so in a particular case.1°9 In Sabbatino,"0 the
Court held that the act of state doctrine precluded the Court from
judging the act of expropriation committed by a recognized government
within its own territory."' The act was attacked principally under
international law and the law of Cuba,"2 and it was contended that
United States law should be applied." 3 The Court held that the act of
state doctrine precluded it from entertaining these challenges." 4 If the
act of state doctrine is a choice-of-law rule as suggested, then the legal
effect of applying it would be to render a decision that the act is valid
and effective under the law chosen. Just as the Earn Line and Adriatic
courts do not hold that the acts were valid under British law, neither
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Adriatic, 258 F. at 902.
106. Id. at 903.
107. IM at 904 (emphasis added).
108. Id at 905.
109. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Banco de Espana
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1940); Earn Line S.S. Co. v. Sutherland
S.S. Co., 254 F. 126, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
110. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398.
111. Id. at 413-15.
112. Id at 401.
113. Id. at 413.
114. Id. at 437.
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does the Sabbatino Court hold that the act was valid under Cuban or
international law.115
The Sabbatino Court did state: "Whether a theory of conversion or
breach of contract is the proper cause of action under New York law,
the presumed validity of the expropriation is unaffected."" 6 Furthermore,
[ilt is plain that if a recognized government sued on a contract
with a United States citizen, concededly legitimate by the locus
of its making, performance, and most significant contacts, the
forum would not apply its own substantive law of contracts.
Since the act of state doctrine reflects the desirability of
presuming the relevant transaction valid, the same result follows;
the forum may not apply its local law regarding foreign ex-
propriations." 7
Although these statements could support the "municipal law" theory,
the language regarding "presumed validity" may simply mean that the act
is "effective," even though conceivably invalid in the sense of non-
compliance with a law. Professor Mann states, however,oin relation to
the Court's refusal to state that the Cuban expropriation was invalid
under international law: "It is a necessary implication that what is not
invalid, must be valid, what is not illegal is legal."" 8 Perhaps that is true,
but it would be equally logical to claim that what the Court meant in
Sabbatino is that the act must be given effect regardless of whether it is
valid or invalid under Cuban or international law. The act would
nevertheless be "valid" or "legal" under the act of state doctrine alone.
As the Court carefully and accurately stated, from the standpoint of
international law, the United States may treat the act in any way it
wishes, regardless of its validity, and international law would not be
offended by that approach." 9 The chosen method of approach is to
apply the act of state doctrine, not the law of the acting state, any other
internal municipal rule, or international law.120 The act of state doctrine
then could be viewed as the only applicable law in a conflict of laws
sense and which alone renders the act "valid."
The "municipal law" theory may be rejected on other grounds as
well. In Sabbatino, the Court expressed concern that judicial decision
115. Sabbazino, 376 U.S. at 439; Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d at 438; 258 F.2d at 904;
Earn Line, 254 F. at 134.
116. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439.
117. Id at 438.
118. F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATiONAL LAw 474-75 (1973).
119. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-23.
120. Id at 421.
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declaring an expropriation valid could embarrass the executive branch of
the government, from a foreign policy standpoint, if the executive branch
took the position that the expropriation was invalid.'2' By applying the
act of state doctrine, the Court did not intend to do the very thing it
sought to avoid. The law of the acting state may incorporate interna-
tional law principles. Surely the Court did not intend to rule in
Sabbatino that the act was presumptively valid under international law.M
While it is more likely that the United States executive branch would
base its claim on international law rather than the municipal law of the
foreign state, a United States court determination that the foreign state's
act was valid and effective under its own law would not necessarily be
totally irrelevant. For example, a case may present a situation where it
is plausible for the United States to assert there has been an arbitrary
and clear violation of the laws of the acting state.'2 ' A United States
Supreme Court decision deeming the act valid under the law of the
acting state could obviously cause embarrassment. 124 The incongruity of
the "municipal law" theory with the rationale of the act of state doctrine
is exemplified in the Banco de Espana case, where the involved govern-
ment asserted that its act was invalid under its own law.' 2' It is perhaps
insulting for a United States court not to entertain that challenge;
however, the insult might be greater if a court upheld the act as valid
under the law of the acting state.
The characterization of the act of state doctrine as a choice-of-law
rule has also recently been questioned by Professor Dellapenna.' 26 He
finds three aspects of the doctrine incompatible with a choice-of-law
characterization: "The doctrine does not apply to general laws; it
precludes inquiry into the legality of the act under the law of the foreign
state; and a judgment dismissing a claim under ... the act of state
doctrine does not preclude a suit elsewhere involving the validity of the
act .. "127
It is true that the act of state doctrine applies only to "public
acts,"' 28 however, this limitation does not necessarily undermine the
121. Id
122. See id at 438-39.
123. Id. at 437.
124. The "embarrassment" theory's relationship with the act of state doctrine is
exemplified in Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1940)
(involved government asserted that its act was invalid under its own law).
125. 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940).
126. J. DELLAPENNA, supra note 5, at 280-84 (1988); see also Note, Allied Bank III and
United States Treatment of Foreign Exchange Controls, 9 B. C. INV'L & COMP. L. REv. 409,
428-31 (1986).
127. J. DELLAPENNA, supra note 5, at 280-81.
128. See, e.&, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)
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choice-of-law characterization. One might contend that there is no
rational ground for including an informal seizure of property within the
ambit of the doctrine and excluding a formal legislative act governing
private relationships. The fact that such distinctions have been made,
however, has no bearing on the question of whether the doctrine is a
choice-of-law rule. Rather, the question should be asked whether,
assuming the choice-of-law characterization, or any other characterization,
there is any rational basis for the distinctions.1 9
Professor Dellapenna's second point is well taken. If the act of state
doctrine requires the application of the law of the acting state, but at the
same time forbids the law's application, this aspect clearly contradicts the
very purpose of a choice-of-law rule - to apply a rule of law to decide an
issue.'3° No serious attempt is made to apply the law of the foreign
state.131 And, invoking a conclusive presumption of validity does not
make the attempt any more serious.132
Professor Dellapenna's third observation is a very valuable contribu-
tion to the debate. When applying its choice-of-law rules, a court
eventually chooses and applies a law to decide the merits.133 Certainly
the court would wish that the finality of the decision bg respected.3
Yet, in a number of cases the courts applied the doctrine and expressly
indicated that relief could be sought elsewhere, through the interventions
of the executive department or in the courts of another country. 35
C. Foreign Law Governing Under the Forum State's Choice-of-Law Rule
Another interpretation of the act of state doctrine is that it is
relevant only when the forum's choice-of-law rule dictates that the law
of the foreign state governs the act.'3 This view has been expressed by
Professor Goldie as follows:
In the United States, the term 'act of state' indicates a private
international law or conflict of laws doctrine of recognition and
(Court declined to extend the act of state doctrine to include the repudiation of a purely
commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its instrumentalities.).
129. Professor Dellapenna concludes that the distinction is supportable on various policy
grounds. J. DELLAPENNA, supra note 5, at 283-84.
130. Id. at 282.
131. Id. at 283.
132. Id at 283-84.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCr OF LAWS § 2 (1971).
134. Id § 1 comment c.
135. See, eg, Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 251 (1897).
136. Goldie, supra note 16, at 110.
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immunity .... This is a rule of private international law
(conflict of laws) of the forum. It comes into play in litigation
over private rights, titles or claims when the forum's choice of
law rule indicates a foreign law as controlling.137
Interestingly, Professor Goldie does not cite any authority for this choice-
of-law prerequisite,lm and as the following discussion reveals, it is hardly
self-evident. It may be merely coincidental that where the doctrine is
applicable, the forum's choice-of-law rule leads to the foreign law.13
Furthermore, this view assumes that there are pertinent choice-of-law
rules in the United States which address the types of issues confronted
in cases dealing with the effect of foreign acts of state.
Dr. Mann expounded upon this theory in the context of expropriation
as follows:
It is a generally accepted principle of private international law
that the transfer of tangible property is subject to the lex rei
sitae, and this is so whether the transfer is effected by private
conveyance, the effect of a statute of limitations, finding, order
of the court or confiscation. It is for this reason, not on account
of the alleged maxim, that in those confiscation cases the official
act of the State in whose territory the property was situated was
considered as legally relevant or, in other words, was recog-
nized.11
It may be that the principle of let rei sitae and the act of state doctrine
137. d. at 109.
138. Id
139. In Sabbatino, in response to the contention that courts of the United States should
apply their own law, the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine "concerns the limits of
determining the validity of an odterwise applicable rule of law." Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 495 (1964) (emphasis added). This statement does not support
those views which characterize the act of state doctrine itself as a choice-of-law rule. It
arguably supports the view under discussion, if we assume that the "rule of law" is
applicable because of the forum's independent choice-of-law rule. The Court did not say
that the forum's choice-of-law rule referred to Cuban law, however, at the time Sabbatino
was decided, it may well have been the case that the validity of transfers of tangible
property was governed, as a matter of choice-of-law, by the lex rei sitae, via, the law of
Cuba. Indeed, in all of the principal act of state cases decided by the Supreme Court, if
one analogized the dispute to a private one, the then-current choice-of-law rule would lead
to the law of the acting state as "governing." Rather than laying down a condition on the
applicability of the act of state doctrine, the Court could have merely been noting that
coincidence. Also, the quoted statement may reflect the fact that the "rule of law" in
Sabbatino was applicable, not because of a choice-of-law rule, but by its own terms.
140. F. MANN, supra note 118, at 440.
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are both rooted in respect for territorial sovereignty, 4' but the conclusion
that the choice-of-law rule, in expropriation and other cases, forms the
basis for the doctrine does not necessarily follow. Also, one cannot
ignore the evolution of the rationale for the act of state doctrine. While
the early act-of-state cases suggested that the doctrine was derived from
a respect for the sovereignty of the state in whose territory the act was
accomplished, the Sabbatino Court adopted a different rationale derived
from the American concept of separation of powers. 42 The Court based
its decision on the principle that to sit in judgment of certain acts of
foreign governments would have the potential of impermissibly interfering
with the executive branch's conduct of foreign relations. 143 As long as
choice-of-law rules are based upon notions of territoriality, the law
chosen would only coincidentally further the same interests served by the
act of state doctrine.
The United States has witnessed a revolution in choice-of-law theory
in the marked move away from territoriality. Current theories in the
United States call for the applicable law in a conflicts setting to be
determined by considering various factorsM including: the involved
jurisdiction's interest in having its respective laws applied; 145 the expecta-
tion of the parties;' 46 basic policies of the specific area of law involved; 47
the certainty, uniformity, predictability,' 48 and ease in applying the
involved jurisdiction's laws.149 The "needs" of the international system
are also included in the list of modern choice-of-law theories in the
most-significant relationship approach.150 Although it is conceivable that
a choice-of-law rule under modern theory would protect the same
interests and promote the same goals and policies as reflected in the
modern act of state doctrine, this is not necessarily assured.' 5l
This particular choice-of-law theory of the act of state doctrine was
analyzed (and rejected) in a recent article 52 in which the author cites
Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n' i5 and Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v.
141. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 145, 188 (1971).
142. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432.
143. Id. at 432-33.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuCT OF LAws § 6(2) (1971).
145. Id. § 6(2)(c).
146. Id § 6(2)(d).
147. Id § 6(2)(e).
148. Id § 6(2)( 0 .
149. Id § 6(2 )(g).
150. Id § 6(2)(a).
151. See Note, supra note 126, at 415-16.
152. Chow, supra note 10, at 430-46.
153. 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Blanco s4 as supporting the theory. In each of these cases the act of
state doctrine was found inapplicable.155 In Johansen, however, the court
did not base its holding on the inapplicability of the foreign law under
the forum's choice-of-law rules. Instead, the court stated that "a decision
for the plaintiffs would in no way effect the integrity of any decree or
regulation of the Cuban government."u' 6 In Blanco, similar reasoning was
used to find the doctrine inapplicable. 117 The court suggests that he
involved state, Cuba, did not have jurisdiction under international law
and was thereby unable to affect the obligations of the involved parties. 158
This is a well-recognized limitation on the applicability of the act of state
doctrine having little to do with choice-of-law rules. 159
The dissenting opinion in Johansen did endorse this theory, as
follows:
I also believe that the act of state doctrine has no application
here, but base my conclusion on an additional ground. Act of
state is a modification of the ordinary conflict rules. . . . 'If un-
der accepted choice of law principles the foreign law should
govern, the court could still refuse to apply that law if it were
found to be contrary to the public policy of the forum. The act
of state doctrine, however, says that the foreign "law" (i.e., the
act of state) must govern certain transactions and that no public
policy of the forum may stand in the way.' 16
The dissent then concluded that "the act of state-here the Cuban 1951
decree - has no relevancy unless the New York courts would apply Cuban
law ... I do not think that they would. 161
There are several problems with the Johansen dissent's conclusion.
First, the quoted passage of Professor Henkin's indicates the exact
opposite of the dissent's conclusion.16 What Henkin was stating, I
believe, was that, regardless of whether some state would refuse to apply
the foreign law under its conflicts rules, the act of state doctrine
154. 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966).
155. Johansen, 447 F.2d at 180; Pan-American, 362 F.2d at 170.
156. Johansen, 447 F.2d at 180.
157. Pan-American, 362 F.2d at 170.
158. Id.
159. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIpD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 443 (1987).
160. Johansen, 447 F.2d at 184 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 184.
162. See Henkin, supra note 26, at 178.
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precludes that result.163 Second, the Johansen dissent's approach to the
applicability of the act of state doctrine runs afoul of the Supreme
Court's holding in Sabbatino.1" There the Court held that the act of
state doctrine is a federal common law rule that is binding on the states
and the supreme law of the land.16 Moreover, the rule of applying state
choice-of-law rules in federal diversity cases is based upon the Erie
doctrine which was held inapplicable in Sabbatino.'6 Accepting the
Johansen dissent's view would mean that the fate of acts of state would
depend upon where suit was filed, for, in today's world, states of the
United States do not adhere to a uniform choice-of-law approach. Even
in a Sabbatino setting, it would not be surprising to find a state, if left
to its own devices, holding that under its choice-of-law approach, forum
law would govern a foreign expropriation. This approach to the
doctrine's applicability is clearly impermissible and could render the act
of state doctrine a dead letter.
In Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Recio,167 Cuba expropriated the
Cuban assets of an insurance company and substituted Cuba as obligor
in an insurance policy issued by the company to Recio, a Cuban
national.' 0 Recio sued for a declaration that he was entitled to the cash
surrender value.169 The insurance company argued that the acts of Cuba
excused it from performance and therefore, under the act of state
doctrine these acts had to be given effect. 70 Because the policy was
payable in the United States, the court held that the law of the United
States governed the method of performance.1 71 The court further held
that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable for several reasons: (1) the
insurance company did business in the United States;'7 (2) the policy
contemplated that the insured could be paid in the United States;173 (3)
the company had obligated itself to pay regardless of Cuban law;'74 and
(4) the total assets of the company were pledged to the payment of the
insurance contract.1 75
163. Id.
164. See id at 173-183.
165. Id at 180.
166. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1964).
167. 154 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
168. Id
169. Id.
170. Id. at 198-99.
171. Id at 198.
172. Id
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Based upon these facts, the Recio court was correct in holding that
the act of state doctrine was inapplicable; however, the inapplicability did
not flow from the court's conclusion that "unless a contrary intention is
expressed in the contract, matters connected with the performance are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance."1 76 As has
been stated before, the doctrine "does not preclude judicial resolution of
all commercial consequences stemming from the occurrence of. . .public
acts."' 77  In Recio, Cuba intended that it, rather than Pan-Am., was
obligated to pay but only in respect to the Cuban assets expropriated. 178
Pan-Am. had obligated itself to pay from its total assets, including those
in the United States.179 Therefore, the court's decision requiring Pan-
Am. to perform did not deny effect to the Cuban act or invalidate it.180
The principal judicial support for this theory might lie in a statement
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Sabbatino. In response to the con-
tention that "the forum should simply apply its own law to all the
relevant transactions,"181 the Court stated:
The act of state doctrine ... concerns the limits for determining
the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law. It is plain that
if a recognized government sued on a contract with a United
States citizen, concededly legitimate by the locus of its making,
performance, and most significant contacts, the forum would not
apply its own substantive law of contracts. Since the act of state
doctrine reflects the desirability of presuming the relevant
transaction valid, the same result follows; the forum may not
apply its local law regarding foreign expropriation.1 2
In the above example, the phrase "otherwise applicable" arguably means
that the law of the acting state is applicable under a choice-of-law rule
in cases where the act of state doctrine is applied; however, the quoted
passage does not make this point clear. Another segment of the Court's
opinion suggests that the Court might have meant that the Cuban
Government, through its judicial authorities, would have found Cuban law
applicable.1 3 An "act of state," then, would most likely require the
176. Id
177. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1980).
178. Recio, 154 So. 2d at 198.
179. Id at 199.
180. Id.
181. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964).
182. Id
183. The lower courts refused to determine the validity of the expropriation under the
law of Cuba. Agreeing with these conclusions, the United States Supreme Court stated:
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acting state to have a law of its own which expressly addresses the
validity and effect of such an act. Such rules are applicable by their own
terms, not because of a choice-of-law rule, and thus may be viewed as
"otherwise applicable." Even if the dictum in Sabbatino is interpreted to
mean that foreign law is applicable via a choice-of-law rule, the Court
does not clearly state that such a condition is a prerequisite to the
applicability of the act of state doctrine. 18
This theory assumes that the policies underlying the doctrine are
implicated only if the law of the foreign state is applicable via choice-
of-law. As noted above, the act of state doctrine was originally based in
part upon concepts of territorial sovereignty, reflected in the classic
formulation of the doctrine: "[Tihe courts of no country sit in judgment
of the acts of another done within its own teritory."Is Similarly, at the
time of the Underhill decision, conflict of laws was based upon a theory
of territoriality.18 Under this theory, the law governing the validity of
property transfers was lex rei sitae,'87 and the law governing rights and
liabilities in tort was lex loci delicti.188 Assuming that it is appropriate to
apply those choice-of-laW rules to determine the validity and effect of
acts of state, then in each Supreme Court case interpreting the act of
state doctrine, the "governing" law would be the law of the acting state.
In Underhill, for example, Venezuelan law would have been chosen
because the detention occurred in Venezuela. Similarly, in Sabbatino,
Cuban law would have been applied to determine the validity and effect
of the property transfer because the transfer occurred in Cuba. Argu-
ably, this coincidence influenced the Court in describing the act of state
doctrine.189 The early Supreme Court cases interpreting the act of state
doctrine held that the doctrine was based primarily on international
comity.190 The Court reasoned that judging acts of state and refusing to
Another ground supports the resolution of this problem in the Courts below.
Were any test to be applied it would have to be what effect the decree would
have if challenged in Cuba. If no institution of legal authority would refuse to
effectuate the decree, its "formal" status -here its argued invalidity if not
properly published in the Official Gazette in Cuba - is irrelevant. It has not been
seriously contended that the judicial institutions of Cuba would declare the
decree invalid.
Id at 415 n.17.
184. Id at 421-27.
185. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (emphasis added).
186. See Kirgis, supra note 6, at 180; see also R. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAws 5-6 (1985).
187. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971.
188. Id
189. Underhil 168 U.S. at 250; Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 405.
190. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THRE UNtED STA TEs 443 comment a (1987).
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recognize them because of their invalidity "would very certainly imperil
the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of
nations." 191 Underhill further suggests that such a course of action would
deprive the acting state of its independence. 192 Even if the law of the
acting state were not applicable under the choice-of-law rule of the
forum, the Court could nevertheless have reached the same result,
because the only prerequisites for applying the act of state doctrine were
that the act of the foreign state was within its territorial jurisdiction and
of a certain type.'93 When Underhill was decided, a nation-state had the
ultimate control over choice-of-law. 194 The territorial law was chosen on
the basis of comity,195 but "lilt is as much a comity shown to the litigants
in referring to the law of the situs ... as a comity to the state whose
law is then enforced." 196 It is unlikely that the courts considered choice-
of-law decisions as leading to the dire consequences envisioned by the
Underhill Court. Choice-of-law rules deal with, ordinarily, rights and
obligations in strictly private cases.' 97 This does not necessarily mean
that the Underhill rationale was correct. It is reasonable to conclude that
to sit in judgment of and to refuse to recognize a territorial act of state
would not deprive that state of its independence. 198 Indeed, the Sab-
batino Court reached this conclusion.'99 The motivations for referring to
foreign laws and for recognizing foreign acts of state, while sharing a
territorial-comity basis, were otherwise distinct and reflected different
policies.2°° Therefore, even at the time Underhill was decided, it is
doubtful that the choice-of-law predicate for the act of state doctrine was
required.
In Sabbatino, the Court recognized that the territorial nature of the
doctrine did not embrace the view that the doctrine was "compelled...
by the inherent nature of sovereign authority. . . .,,20 Furthermore, "If
a transaction takes place in one jurisdiction and the forum is in another,
191. Ricaud v. American Metal Co. Ltd., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
192. Underhi/4 168 U.S. at 252.
193. 14
194. See R. MINOR, supra note 186, at 5-6 ("It is one of the fundamental principles of
this branch of the law that each sovereign State is supreme within its own limits. It is
therefore within the power of such a State at any time to exclude any or all foreign laws
from operation within its borders.").
195. See J. STORY, CONFLICT' OF LAws 45-48 (3d ed. 1846).
196. R. MINOR, supra note 186, at 5.
197. Id
198. Id at 3.
199. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
200. Id at 409.
201. Id at 421.
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the forum does not by dismissing an action or by applying its own law
purport to divest the first jurisdiction of its territorial sovereignty."20
Yet, the Court did not adopt the rationale that deference to foreign acts
of state would only be accorded if the acting state's law were applicable
under choice-of-law theory.m Rather, the Court's rationale was derived
from the concept of separation of powers because judging the validity of
the expropriation could have adversely effected the executive branch's
foreign policy.Y Once again, it is plausible that the new rationale for
the act of state doctrine would call for its application regardless of
whether the choice-of-law rule leads to the application of a foreign law.
The Sabbatino Court expressly noted that where a foreign state ex-
propriates property in its territory, a declaration of invalidity by a United
States court could insult that state.3 Because the foreign state's act
would be proper jurisdictionally, the likelihood of insult would seem to
exist apart from choice-of-law considerations.
When Underhill was decided, existing choice-of-law rules were
formulated with strictly private cases in mind which do not raise
separation of powers concerns.20 This is also true regarding choice-of-
law rules based upon the territorial concept.207 As noted above, while
modern "policy-oriented" approaches to choice-of-law are arguably broad
enough to include separation of powers issues, unlike territorial choice-
of-law rules, these approaches require a determination of what the law
is and the result of its application before the law is considered to be
applicable.m Under modern "policy-oriented" approaches such as
interest analysis and the most-significant-relationship approach, in a
Sabbatino setting, a determination whether the expropriation was valid
under Cuban law would be required.2 9 The Sabbatino Court expressly
rejected this approach:
The courts below properly declined to determine if issuance of
the expropriation decree complied with the formal requisites of
Cuban law .... An inquiry by United States courts into the
202. Id
203. Id at 428.
204. Id. at 432-33.
205. Id at 431-32.
206. See Chow, supra note 10, at 435.
207. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 445-46 (White, I., dissenting).
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, § 6 (1971).
209. "A court cannot undertake interest analysis without a searching examination of
the policies and interests of the forum, the foreign state, and any other interested state.
This is precisely the sort of inquiry that the act of state [dloctrine seeks to prevent." .
DELLAPENNA, supra note 5, at 280.
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validity of an act of an official of a foreign state would not only
be exceedingly difficult but, if wrongly made, would be likely to
be highly offensive to the state in question.210
Finally, another aspect of any choice-of-law rule militates against the
prerequisite of determining whether the state action is valid under the
state's domestic law. With respect to Professor Mann's view that
expropriation cases are controlled by lex rei sitae,211 Professor Re
responded as follows:
It is submitted that it is incorrect to say that 'It is for this
reason, [referring to the conflict of laws principle] not on
account of the alleged maxim, that in those confiscation cases
the official act of the state in whose territory the property was
situate was considered as legally relevant, or, in other words, was
recognized.' It is agreed that in many of the cases that have
arisen the solution could have been arrived at by the application
of the conflict of laws ... choice of law principle. Indeed, in
many of the cases this reason was actually stated as the basis for
the decision, or rather, was given as a reason supplementary to
the principle of non-review of the foreign act of government. It
is also true that the solution would be one of the ... conflict of
laws if the cases were to be determined by the law of place
governing the jural relation. If what was done was done pur-
suant to, and is regarded as legal by the governing law, the case
could be decided by applying the choice of law principle of the
conflict of laws. However, how does such a principle cope with
the objection that what was done was not done according to the
organic law of the place where the operative facts occurred? If the
problem were to be entirely one of the conflict of laws, it should
be open to the parties to prove the foreign law as a matter of
fact, and since it would be the governing law the legality or
illegality of the seizure should be tested as against such foreign
law. This would not differ from any other problem of the
conflict of laws wherein the crucial problem is a choice of law
problem.212
The purpose of applying a choice-of-law rule is to discover the rule of
law to be applied to a particular issue. Where the act of state doctrine
210. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 415 n.17.
211. See F. MANN, supra note 140, at 440.
212. E. RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS IN ANGLO AMEuCAN LAw 159-60 (1951) (emphasis
in original).
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is applicable, however, the law of the foreign state (which under a
choice-of-law theory purportedly has been chosen as "governing" the act)
is irrelevant.2u Professor Re's argument is devastating to this choice-
of-law theory. To justify it, one must assume that the foreign law
"governs," regardless of the outcome of its application, and breathes life
into the act of state doctrine. But if the foreign law is irrelevant, there
simply is no reason for imposing this condition.
It may be argued that the description is really addressed to a
negative proposition, to wit, the act of state doctrine is inapplicable
where the choice-of-law rule of the forum selects some other law as
applicable to the act. The fact that the conditions for the applicability
of a choice-of-law rule are fulfilled, which would lead to some law other
than the acting state's as governing the merits, may be a factor in
determining the applicability of the act of state doctrine. For example,
the act of state doctrine has been held inapplicable in cases where the
act of a state is not "done" in the territory of the acting state,214 or
where the act purports to affect interests outside the territory.215 Under
a territorial approach to choice-of-law, the condition for the applicability
of the choice-of-law rule, lex rei sitae, is not fulfilled when the act is done
outside of the foreign state;2 6 yet, in these cases the doctrine does not
apply because of a choice-of-law decision, but rather because there is less
potential in such cases for upsetting the government's expectation in
having its act effectuated.217 Furthermore, to accept the choice-of-law
prerequisite theory fully one would have to assume that the choice-of-
law rule not only renders the law of the acting state inapplicable, but
also renders some other jurisdiction's law applicable. No attempt is
made in these cases to discover the applicable law by the choice-of-law
rule that purportedly has been applied.
The relationship between the act of state doctrine and choice-of-
law rules has been described aptly by the Supreme Court in First Nat'
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba18 as follows:
The act of state doctrine represents an exception to the general
rule that a court of the United States, where appropriate
213. Id
214. Carl Zeiss Stifling v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 910 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970).
215. Id
216. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 9 (1971).
217. See, e&, Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,
521-22 (2d Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrFD
STATES § 443 comment b (1987).
218. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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jurisdictional standards are met, will decide cases before it by
choosing the rules appropriate for decision from among various
sources of law including international law. ... The doctrine
precludes any review whatever of the acts of... one sovereign
... by the courts of another sovereign state.2 19
Choice-of-law rules thus have no bearing on the effect of acts of state
until the act of state doctrine has been found inapplicable.M Conflict of
laws principles are, however, relevant in respect to subsidiary issues that
might arise in a case involving the effect of an act of a state. For
example, where a foreign state attempts to act with respect to intan-
gibles, a question might arise concerning the locus of the property. The
use of conflict of laws principles to resolve these issues is different from
using choice-of-law principles initially to determine the applicable law.21
III. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AS A CONFLICT OF LAWS RULE
Conflict of laws principles traditionally incorporate three major
subsets: rules of judicial jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules, and the effects
of judgments in cases that have multi-state or multi-jurisdictional
contacts.222 The act of state doctrine is neither a choice-of-law rule nor
a jurisdictional rule.22  Thus, the classification of the act of state
doctrine as one of these rules for the purpose of conflict of laws is
misleading.224
Jurisdictional rules determine the extent to which a territorial unit,
through its judiciary, has the power to affect the legal rights and
obligations of parties in a particular case.225 Jurisdictional rules do not
determine the ultimate rights and obligations of the parties, but rather
they determine whether the court may decide those issues between the
219. Id at 763 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)).
220. Id
221. Indeed, in some cases, it appears that it was open to the court to determine that
under choice-of-law theory the law of the foreign state was inapplicable. Yet, the courts
did npt rationalize their decisions along those lines. See, e.g, National Am. Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
222. RESrATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAws § 2; R. MINOR, supra note 188, at
5-6.
223. RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrTD STATES § 443
reporters' note 1 (1987).
224. RESrATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLUCr OF LAws § 2; R. MINOR, supra note 188, at
5-6.
225. Where foreign elements are involved, see RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF
LAws § 2 comment a (1971).
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particular parties involved. 6  All civilized nation-states have special
jurisdictional rules regarding cases having foreign elements.227 It is not
inconceivable that a rule may deny jurisdiction to courts or require courts
to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases which involve an attack on
the validity of an act of a foreign nation state. 2 Indeed, in Underhill?29
where the Court first applied the act of state doctrine, the Court stated
that the "courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory." 3° This rule
could ostensibly be satisfied if a court simply refused to hear the case.
In Underhill, an American plaintiff sued a Venezuelan military com-
mander for illegal detention.231 The practical effect of denying jurisdic-
tion was the same as non-suiting the plaintiff.232
As was true in Underhill, however, application of the doctrine did not
prevent the Court from addressing the merits, albeit in an unusual way. 33
This was made clear by the Court in Ricaud3 and Sabbatino.235  In
Ricaud, the plaintiff sued to recover ownership of goods which had been
confiscated by the Mexican Government.?' The defendant derived his
title to the goods from the title acquired by the confiscation.237 The
Court held that the act of state doctrine was applicable and further
stated:
[The act of state doctrine] does not deprive the courts of
jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It requires only that,
when it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted
in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the details
of such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned
but must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision.
To accept a ruling authority and to decide accordingly is not a
surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise of
it. 8
226. Id
227. Id
228. Id
229. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1987).
230. Id
231. Id at 251.
232. Id (Circuit Court of Appeals directed a verdict for the defendant).
233. Id at 253-54.
234. Ricaud v. American Metal Co. Ltd., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
235. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
236. Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 306.
237. Id
238. Id at 309; see also DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1370, 1374 (D.
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Moreover, the Court held that the seizure had the "effect of divesting
the title to or ownership of it of a certain citizen of the United
States."' 9 Thus, the act of state doctrine operated to lead to a decision
on the merits of the underlying dispute.240
In Sabbatino, Cuba asserted ownership of funds realized on the sawe
of a cargo of sugar which it had expropriated. 241 The lower courts
refused to recognize the expropriation because Cuba's act violated
international law;242 the Court held that the act of state doctrine applied.
The clear implication of this holding is that the lower courts had to
recognize the expropriation by granting Cuba the relief it requested.2 43
Such a ruling is hardly "jurisdictional."2"
To be sure, some courts continue to interpret the act of state
doctrine as jurisdictional,245 either as an issue preclusion device, 246 a
subject matter limitation, 247 or as a doctrine of abstention.24 These
characterizations are not inaccurate because the doctrine does preclude
the courts from entertaining challenges to an act of a state on the basis
that the act is illegal, invalid, or ineffective under some independent legal
standard.2 49 Nevertheless, to characterize the act of state doctrine in
jurisdictional terms is misleading because it suggests that no decision on
the merits was reached.
An act of state may be, but rarely is, a judgment of the court.20°
Hawaii 1982).
239. Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 310.
240. Id
241. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 406.
242. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aftd, 307
F.2d 845, 861-66 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
243. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-39.
244. See, e.g., Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credita Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 530 (2d Cir.
1985); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977); Pasos v. Pan-American Airways,
229 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1956); Sharon v. Time, Inc. 599 F. Supp. 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
245. See, e.g., Hunt, 550 F.2d 68; 229 F.2d at 272; Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 546. Contra
Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 520.
246. See, e.g, Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp. 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir.
1980); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
247. See, e.g., DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1370, 1374 n.7 (D. Hawaii
1982).
248. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir.
1979).
249. See RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
443 comment d (1987).
250. Id § 443 comment i.
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Although it could be said that a state is furthering its own interests
where its court adjudicates a dispute on the merits, according to accepted
orthodoxy, judgments involving private rights of private litigants do not
rise to the level of an act of state for purposes of the doctrine.251
It is my view that, even though the act of state doctrine is not a
jurisdictional, choice-of-law, or judgments rule, it is nevertheless a conflict
of laws rule.252 The subject matter of conflicts of law includes not only
those three major subjects, but more broadly and generally comprises
those rules which determine the effect of the fact a case has significant
contact with more than one jurisdiction. 253 Under this accepted view of
the field of conflict of laws, the act of state doctrine is obviously a
conflict of laws rule.254 By precluding the courts from sitting in judgment
of an act of a foreign state and requiring a court to give that act effect,
the doctrine determines the effect given to the foreign elements (i.e., the
foreign state's act and the fact that it is "done" in foreign territory).
In the parlance of private international law, rules exist that are
termed variously as rules of immediate application,255 "legislatively
localized rules," 256 and rules which determine their own sphere of
application.25" These are conflicts rules which, like choice-of-law rules,
result in a decision on the merits of a conflicts issue when they are
applied. These "self-directive" 258 rules differ, however, from choice-of-
law rules in that the former, unlike the latter, contain within themselves
the rule of decision.259 Once the conditions on the applicability of a self-
directive rule are fulfilled, it is unnecessary to refer to any other rule of
law to determine the issue.26 In contrast, a choice-of-law rule requires
the application of another substantive internal rule of law.261
While a state usually legislates and a court interprets rules regarding
251. See Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 855.
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 comment a (1971);
REsrATEMEN (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 443 reporters'
note 1 (1987).
253. See RESTATEMmENT (SECOND) OF CONFuCT OF LAWS § 2 (1971).
254. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RE.ATIONS LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES
§ 443 reporters' note 1 (1987).
255. See Francescakis, Quelques precisions sur les lois d'application immediate, 55 REv.
CRn. 1 (1966).
256. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAw PROCESS 225 (1965).
257. See Talpis, Legal Rules Which Determine Their Own Sphere of Application, 17 REv.
JURIDIOUE THEMIS 201 (1982).
258. "Self-Directive Rules" is a term coined by the author.
259. See Talpis, supra note 257, at 201.
260. A self-directive rule may require a reference to foreign law to determine if the
conditions of the rule are met.
261. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
[Vol. 10
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE & CONFLICT OF LAWS
domestic conduct, a state legislature and a court may deal with a foreign
element through a self-directive rule.262 Self-directive rules take prece-
dence over choice-of-law rules, because the result derived from the
application of a self-directive rule will not be displaced even if another
result might follow under the forum's choice-of-law rules.26 The act of
state doctrine is indeed a "special" conflict of laws rule of this type. .
Once it has been determined that the foreign government acted in a
certain way over the subject matter of the litigation,2 the courts of the
United States must give effect to the act, regardless of its validity,
effectiveness, legality, merit, and underlying motivations.76 Once the
condition is fulfilled, the rule does not require the court to look to any
rule of law other than the doctrine itself to determine the merits.267
Theoretically, a self-directive rule may be enacted for any reason by
a legislature or formulated for any reason by a court. It is incorrect to
evaluate the act of state doctrine under choice-of-law theory. The
doctrine arises out of foreign policym and separation of powers con-
cerns,29 and difficulties in formulating applicable standards. 270 Therefore,
it is inappropriate to assess and critique these rationales solely under
choice-of-law theory.
IV. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DEEMED INAPPLICABLE
In various circumstances, an act of state may be a relevant fact in a
case, but the act of state doctrine will be found inapplicable.271 When
this occurs, a court must determine what law governs the rights and
liabilities of the parties.772 Professor Kirgis stated that where the doctrine
is found inapplicable, "in the absence of a statutory directive, the court
would then use its normal choice-of-law approach to select the governing
262. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuC' OF LAws § 6 comment b (1971); see also
A. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 72-73 (1943).
263. See A NUSSBAUM, supra note 262, at 72-73.
264. Although the phenomenon is expressly recognized in the American Restatement
(see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 6 comment (1971)), and numerous
treatises (see, eg&, A NUSSBAUM, supra note 262, at 71; D. CAVERS, supra note 256, at 225)),
it has not been the subject of much academic inquiry.
265. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
266. Id
267. Id
268. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
269. Id at 423.
270. Id at 430.
271. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 58.
272. Id
1989]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
law." 2 3 This view is questionable.
Cases in which the act of state is not "done within the territory" of
the foreign government present a situation where the act of state
doctrine is inapplicable and there is no "statutory directive." Yet, the
effect of the act in this situation is not subjected to a "normal" choice-
of-law analysis. 274 The act of state doctrine in such cases is given effect
if it would not be contrary to United States public policy to do so.
275
Many of the "extraterritorial" cases involve an attempt by a foreign
government to gain title to property located outside the territory of that
government.2 76 The issue becomes whether an act, such as an expropria-
tion decree, is effective to pass title to the government. Under an
ordinary choice-of-law approach, a court would determine which law
governs the issue; this approach is not taken in the extraterritorial cases.
Assuming that the state action is a law and that that "law" is chosen
subject to United States public policy, the process is hardly "normal."
The cases simply do not elicit why the law is chosen in terms of choice-
of-law. Certainly, the result could not be explained by the vested rights
theory of choice-of-law because the crucial act is not consummated intra-
territorially. Although some modern theories of choice-of-law (such as
interest or most-significant-relationship analyses) might explain the
results, no choice-of-law analysis is undertaken in these cases.277
Another exception to the act of state doctrine was recognized in First
Nat' City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,278 where the Court held that
the act of state doctrine did not bar a claim to set off expropriation
losses against a Cuban bank's claim. The defendant argued that the
expropriation was invalid under international law and thus, it was entitled
to relief.m If the issues in City Bank were subjected to "normal" choice-
273. Id
274. See, eg., Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'i City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
(Judicial notice could recognize Canadian case law when deciding to enforce an Iranian
government order to confiscate a deceased Iranian king's stock in a Canadian corporation
that was held in a custodial account of a New York bank.).
275. See, e.g., RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrIED STATES
§ 443 (1987).
276. See, eg, Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398.
277. In both interest analysis and most-significant relationship analysis the "interest"
of a state in having its law applied is highly relevant to the result. Under interest analysis,
foreign law would not be applied if that state had no interest in having it applied.
"Interest" is a term of art and depends upon whether the policy underlying the law would
be furthered by applying the rule. Where the act would be invalid under the municipal law
of the acting state, the state would arguably have no "interest" in having the rule applied.
See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
278. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
279. Id. at 762.
280. Id at 775, 779 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of-law methodology, the Court's inquiry would focus on which law
governs the question of whether and to what extent the defendant may
recover for a taking of property which violated international law.Bl
Although the Court suggests that a normal choice-of-law analysis is
proper under these circumstances,m the lower courts did not pursue this
method. Instead, the lower courts fashioned a rule by which the
defendant was able to set-off its losses up to the extent of the plaintiff's
claim3
Even where the relevant act is attributable to a foreign state, but is
"non-public," thus arguably removing the applicability of the act of state
doctrine, courts which accept this limitation do not treat the case
normally.2 In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,'s the
issue in question was the effect of Cuba's refusal to reimburse a private
company for an overpayment it made to Cuban agents on a tobacco
transaction. A plurality of the Court determined that the act was
commercial, and that this characterization removed the act of state
doctrine from consideration2 7 and held that the law of international trade
governed this issue3m Although this may have been a preferable choice-
of-law decision, it is hardly normal. Given the facts of this case, a
normal choice-of-law decision would apply the revelant internal rule of
either Cuba or the United States.
Finally, the Hickenlooper Amendment,289 which removes the act of
state doctrine from cases involving certain takings of property in violation
of international law, arguably permits subjecting certain expropriation
cases to normal choice-of-law methodology.290 Nevertheless, the few cases
decided under the Hickenlooper Amendment have eschewed this
approach in favor of a "dead reckoning" -the creation of a rule of law
drawn from principles of international law and equity. 9 This particular
281. Id at 763.
282. Id at 763-70.
283. Sabbatino, 478 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1973). The Court of Appeals upheld the
"setoff" of the Cuban government because "[tihe Cuban confiscation of the bank's property
violated international law." Id
284. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 58-61.
285. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
286. Id at 684.
287. Id at 695-706.
288. Id at 703-05.
289. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
290. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 61 n.16.
291. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Pam El Commercio Exterior De Cuba ("Bancec"),
462 U.S. 611, 630-33 (1983); see, a&, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1967). While such cases could be explained on the basis that there is a "statutory directive"
to fashion a rule, none of the cases attempt to justify decisions on that basis.
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approach was endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1983 in First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba ("Bancec'). 292 In
Bancec, the Court held that, under principles of equity (i.e., federal
common law), an American bank could recover Cuban expropriation
losses from the Cuban bank, despite the latter's immunity under Cuban
law from liability for Cuban debts." Bancec is particularly significant
because the Court expressly rejected a choice-of-law approach.3
V. THE DANGER OF CHARACTERIZING THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
AS A CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
Clearly, a possible danger arises when the act of state doctrine is
characterized as a choice-of-law rule or when it is found inapplicable
and, thus, an act of state is subject to a normal choice-of-law approach.
Although choice-of-law principles reflect a respect for territorial sover-
eignty, as does the act of state doctrine, these principles developed
almost exclusively with strictly private cases in mind.M Choice-of-law
principles also encompass situations where the legislative or judicial rules
of contact jurisdictions are developed with only strictly domestic cases in
mind. In addition, a choice-of-law problem contemplates that each con-
tact state has a relevant rule.
In act of state cases, an atypical situation arises from a choice-of-
law perspective. Consider, for example, the usual expropriation case: the
Cuban Government expropriates the property of P in Cuba. P, an Amer-
ican, sues the Cuban Government, contending that title did not pass to
Cuba because the expropriation was confiscatory and that P is therefore
entitled to have the property returned to him. After isolating the issue,
the inquiry would focus on what law applies. Under traditional choice-
of-law theory, Cuban law would indeed govern those issues because of
the rule of lex rei sitae; however, this raises problems. The choice-of-
law rule is designed to choose the law that governs transfers of property
between private persons.3 The hypothetical case presented was not
contemplated when the rule was formulated. The relevant Cuban law is
either constitutional or statutory and has as its express purpose the
determination of the rights and obligations of the public entity of Cuba,
292. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633 ("Our decision today announces no mechanical formula
for determining the circumstances under which the normally separate juridical status of a
government instrumentality is to be disregarded. Instead, it is the product of the application
of internationally recognized equitable principles to avoid . . .injustice.").
293. Id at 630-34.
294. Id at 621-22.
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFULCT OF LAWS § 1 comment a (1971).
296. Id. § 2, comment a.
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either the state itself or one of its agencies.
Similar problems arise under modern choice-of-law approaches.
These approaches contemplate not only private laws, but also a "conflict"
of two rules, Cuban or United States, the application of either of which
leads to conflicting decisions. The relevant rule of Cuba, as explained
above, is not the type of rule contemplated in modern or traditional
approaches. But, if relevant Cuban law is considered to be potentially
applicable, then the question arises: With which United States law does
it conflict? Unlike the typical case presenting a choice-of-law question,
here, because there is no relevant federal rule, a new rule would have to
be created. The only imaginable rule would be one which is addressed
specifically to foreign states. When such a rule is created, the choice-
of-law issue evaporates. At best, the choice is between a foreign nation
law and some state law rule. Embarking upon this choice poses several
difficult problems. Even if the choice-of-law rule always led to the
application of foreign law (to determine the consequences of the involved
act), such an approach could have potentially adverse implications for
good foreign policy. Although the approaches that courts invoke to date
can be criticized for a lack of explained results, they attempt to improve
harmony between nations and to accommodate competing interests of the
private and public parties involved. This is a task that normal choice-
of-law methods cannot perform well.
VI. CONCLUSION
The act of state doctrine is not a choice-of-law rule. The doctrine
does not choose the act and convert that act into a rule of law, nor does
it choose the law of the foreign state and create a presumption that the
act is valid and effective under that law. The doctrine's applicability
does not depend upon a preliminary choice-of-law decision. If the
doctrine is inapplicable, it is demonstrably clear that courts do not treat
the relevant act of state under normal choice-of-law principles; nor
should they.
Characterizing the act of state doctrine as a choice-of-law rule, or
concluding that it is applicable only where the choice-of-law rule of the
forum chooses a particular foreign law, contributes to the confusion
surrounding the doctrine and adds an unwarranted cogency to adverse
criticism of the doctrine. Interpretation of the act of state doctrine as
requiring application of a law which is invalid under strictly domestic law
and international law, but is treated as valid by the United States, may
properly lead to the rejection of the doctrine by the international
community. Furthermore, a misconception that the doctrine is a choice-
of-law rule might justify its replacement by an approach based upon
choice-of-law rules, methods, and theories. My intent is to present the
doctrine in its proper .place in order to avoid the pitfalls which lurk in
1989]
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the wake of an erroneous characterization. The doctrine is not a rule of
judicial jurisdiction, nor one respecting foreign nation judgments, nor
choice-of-law. Rather, it is a special rule of conflict of laws, and must
be evaluated on the basis of that characterization.
